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Abstract 
Lebar's lively discussion builds on a critique of neural models of vision that is incorrect in its 
general and specific claims. He espouses a Gestalt perceptual approach, rather than one 
consistent with the "objective neurophysiological state of the visual system" (p. 1 ). 
Contempormy vision models realize his perceptual goals and also quantitatively explain 
neurophysiological and anatomical data. 
COMMENTARY 
Lehar describes a "serious crisis" (p. I), "an impasse" and a "theoretical dead end" (p.2) in 
contemporary models of vision and advances as a possible alternative his Gestalt Bubble 
approach "which is unlike any algorithm devised by man" (p. 2). He also claims that "Gestalt 
aspects of perception have been largely ignored" (p. 2) by neural models of vision and then goes 
on to describe presumed dichotomies between equaiiy desperate attempts to understand how the 
brain sees. Lehar particularly comments about modeling work by my coiieagues and myself, 
noting that "the most serious limitation of Grossberg's approach ... is that, curiously, 
Grossberg ... did not extend their goal to ... three-dimensional spatial perception [and] no longer 
advocated explicit spatial fiiiing-in" (p. 11). He also says it is "impossible for Grossberg's model 
to represent transparency ... " (p. 12). These general and specific claims unfortunately do not 
accurately represent the published literature about neural vision models. Lehar seems motivated 
to trash neural vision models because his own model makes no contact with neurophysiological 
and anatomical data about vision. 
In reality, there is an emerging neural theory of 3D vision and figure-ground perception, caiied 
FACADE theory, for the multiplexed Form-And-Color-And-DEpth representations that the 
theory attempts to explain (Grossberg, 1987, 1994, 1997). Lehar refers to my 1994 article in 
summarizing the deficiencies of our models. However, this article explains many 3D figure-
ground, grouping, and fiiiing-in percepts, including transparency, and uses an explicit surface 
fiiiing-in process. Later work from our group developed these qualitative proposals into 
quantitative simulations of many 3D percepts, including 3D percepts of daVinci stereopsis, 
figure-ground separation, texture segregation, brightness perception, and transparency 
(Grossberg and McLoughlin, 1997; Grossberg and Keiiy, 1999; Grossberg and Pessoa, 1998, 
Keiiy and Grossberg, 2000; McLoughlin and Grossberg, 1998). 
These studies laid the foundation for a breakthrough in understanding how some of these 
processes are organized within identified laminar circuits of c01tical areas Vl and V2, notably 
processes of cortical development, learning, attention, and grouping, including Gestalt grouping 
properties (Grossberg, 1999a; Grossberg, Mingoiia, and Ross, 1997; Grossberg and Raizada, 
2000; Grossberg and Seitz, 2003; Grossberg and Williamson, 2001; Raizada and Grossberg, 
2001, 2003; Ross, Grossberg, and Mingoiia, 2000). 
This LAMINART model has been joined with the FACADE model to develop a 3D 
LAMINART model that quantitatively simulates many perceptual data about stereopsis and 3D 
planar surface perception, and to functionaiiy explain anatomical and neurophysiological ceil 
properties in cortical layers 1, 2/3A, 38, 4, 5, and 6 of areas VI and V2 (Grossberg and Howe, 
2003; Howe and Grossberg, 2001), and uses 3D figure-ground and fiiiing-in concepts to do so. 
More recently, the 3D LAMINART model has been generalized to explain how 3D percepts of 
slanted and curved surfaces and of 2D images are formed, and clarified how 3D grouping and 
filling-in can occur over multiple depths (Grossberg and Swaminathan, 2003; Swaminathan and 
Grossberg, 2001). This work includes explanations of how identified cortical cells in cortical 
areas VI and V2 develop to enable these representations to form, how 3D Necker cube 
representations rival bistably through time, how slant aftereffects occur, and how 3D neon color 
spreading of curved surfaces occurs even at depths which contain no explicit bottom-up inputs. 
All these studies are consistent with the grouping interpolation properties that Kellman et a! 
(1996) have repmted (p. 51), and the 3D grouping properties summarized in Figure 16 that Lehar 
seems to think cannot yet be neurally explained. 
These modeling mticles show that many of the perceptual goals ofLehar's Gestalt Bubble model 
are well-handled by neural models that also provide a detailed account of how the visual cortex 
generates these perceptual effects. In summary, we do not need analogies like soap bubble (p. 
28), or rod-and-rail (p. 32), or different local states to represent opaque or transparent surface 
properties (p. 35), as Lehar proposes (p. 28). The brain has discovered a much more interesting 
solution to these problems, which links its ability to develop and learn from the world with its 
ability to see it. 
Lehar makes many other claims that are not suppmtable by present theoretical knowledge. He 
claims that "we cannot imagine how contemporary concepts of neurocomputation ... can account 
for the propetties of perception as observed in visual consciousness [including] hallucinations" 
(p. 9). Actually, current neural models offer an explicit account of schizophrenic hallucinations 
(Grossberg, 2000) as manifestations of a breakdown in the normal processes of learning, 
expectation, attention, and consciousness (Grossberg, 1999b). 
Contrary to Lehar's claims on pp. 43-45, recent neural models clarifY how the brain learns spatial 
representations of azimuth, elevation, and vergence (see Figure 14) for purposes of, say, eye and 
arm movement control (Greve, Grossberg, Guenther, and Bullock, 1993; Guenther, Bullock, 
Greve, and Grossberg, 1994). Lehar defends "the adaptive value of a neural representation of the 
external world that could break free of the tissue of the sensory or cortical surface ... " (p. 46). 
Instead, What stream representations of visual percepts should be distinguished from Where 
stream representations of spatial location, a distinction made manifest by various clinical 
patients. 
Lehar reduces neural models of vision to capacities of computers to include navigation as another 
area where models cannot penetrate (p. 49). Actually, neural models quantitatively simulate the 
recorded dynamics of MST cortical cells and the psychophysical repmts of navigating humans 
(Grossberg, Mingolla, and Pack, 1999), contradicting Lehar's claim that "the picture of visual 
processing revealed by the phenomenological approach is radically different from the picture 
revealed by neurophysiological studies" (p. 48). In fact, a few known properties of cortical 
neurons, when interacting together, can generate emergent propetties of human navigation. 
Lehar ends by saying that "curiously, these most obvious properties of perception have been 
systematically ignored by neural modelers" (p. 54). Curiously, Lehar has not kept up with the 
modeling literature that he incorrectly characterizes and criticizes. 
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